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ABSTRACT 6 
This paper explores the reasons why payers, intermediaries, and providers engage in PES 7 
even under uncertainty about outcomes, and how they relate to the long term durability of 8 
the scheme. In theory, it is expected that, in face of high uncertainty, payers would leave the 9 
projects if effectiveness cannot be demonstrated and providers would not keep their 10 
conservation practices if no money remains available. Consequently, it is also expected that 11 
PES proponents would do their best to demonstrate ES improvement/maintenance. To 12 
explore these hypotheses we use field data collected from PES schemes in Colombia. Our 13 
results show that payers have additional motivations for engaging beyond ES improvement 14 
(e.g., CSR, green image). These motivations may explain their permanence in the scheme 15 
even without evidence of effectiveness. Water quantity/quality concerns were the main 16 
driver for participation of providers, evidencing that they do not see themselves only as 17 
providers but also as users. Therefore, the lack of evidence of effectiveness could discourage 18 
their permanence. Intermediaries are the ones mostly concerned about presenting evidence 19 
of PES effectiveness for many reasons (e.g. reputation, engaging stakeholders). PES may 20 
survive in the long term due to additional motivations from stakeholders, however, evidence 21 




  The Ecosystem Services (ES) concept has gained strong rhetorical power (Kull et al., 24 
2015) and is shaping practices among conservationists (Fisher and Brown, 2014). Non-25 
government organizations and development agencies are increasingly working with 26 
instruments derived from the ES approach such as Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) 27 
schemes (Ezzine-De-Blas et al., 2016; Grima et al., 2016). 28 
  Funding from private and public companies has been strategic for several 29 
conservation schemes in Latin America. In order to communicate better with the business 30 
sector so as to attract more funding conservation organizations have been adapting their 31 
discourses towards a more business-like language with the utilitarian arguments of the ES 32 
approach (Fisher and Brown, 2014). In doing so, several of them have ended up using 33 
business jargons, for example, investment portfolio, business case, performance indicator, 34 
return-on-investment (e.g. Boyd et al., 2012; Hanson et al., 2012, 2011). The growing use of 35 
business-like language on ES approaches is frequently supported by the use of predictive 36 
numbers derived from ES modelling (e.g. Crossman et al., 2013; Quintero et al., 2009; 37 
Ruckelshaus et al., 2015; Tallis and Polasky, 2009). Practitioners have also placed strong 38 
emphasis on cost comparison of conservation strategies versus conventional solutions for 39 
the same ends (e.g. ‘green infrastructure’ versus ‘gray infrastructure’, see Bennett and Ruef, 40 
2016; Calvache et al., 2012; Postel and Thompson, 2005). Finally, they have given priority to 41 
PES over other policy tools expecting to achieve more effective ES conservation. Along these 42 
lines, there has been a recent increase in the interest of some PES payers to adopt 43 
performance-based payments and thus the need for PES impact evidence (Gammie, 2016).  44 
  The idea of securing ES provision through payment schemes has been strongly 45 
promoted by some scholars (e.g. Wunder, 2005; Wunder et al. 2008; Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; 46 
 
 
Ferraro 2011) and propagated in practical discourses towards potential payers. However, 47 
this approach to conservation has been deeply criticized in the literature because of the 48 
implied simplification of social-ecological systems (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Muradian et al., 49 
2010; Norgaard, 2010) and the practical difficulty to prove ‘service delivery’ (Carpenter et al., 50 
2009; Lele, 2009; Palmer and Filoso, 2009; Ponette-González et al., 2014). This way of 51 
approaching and practicing conservation implies a control over a service being sold which 52 
may not actually be secured, especially in the case of water-related PES schemes (Barnaud 53 
and Antona, 2014; Kosoy and Corbera, 2010). Examples of targeted services in these cases 54 
are water flow regulation, water quality maintenance, and water provision. So far, 55 
incomplete knowledge about the processes behind water-related services together with a 56 
lack of monitoring best practices in most cases have hindered the evidence of PES impacts 57 
(Bohensky and Lynam, 2005; Carpenter et al., 2009; Lele, 2009; Norgaard, 2010; Palmer and 58 
Filoso, 2009). 59 
Discourses based strongly on economic aspects disregarding scientific uncertainty 60 
underlying ES provision can lead to unrealistic expectations from actors involved in these 61 
schemes. If expectations are not fulfilled those schemes may not endure. Under this 62 
perspective, a question remains empirically under-explored: will PES schemes survive in the 63 
long-term if no evidence of their impact on the target ES is achieved? Which motivations 64 
would maintain the long-term participation of providers, payers and intermediaries in the 65 
schemes, even under uncertainty?  If uncertainty is large, practitioners cannot prove PES 66 
effectiveness through impact evidence, and payers are only looking for returns in terms of 67 
ES, then they would leave the PES scheme. This hypothesis would align with conventional 68 
views of PES (e.g. Ferraro and Kiss, 2002). As pointed by Wunder (2005, p. 3), “the less 69 
realistic the scientific basis of a PES scheme, the more exposed it is to the risk of buyers 70 
 
 
questioning its rationale and abandoning payments”. Consequently, assuming that 71 
landowners are acting solely as “providers” of a service based on a rational and utility-72 
maximizer perspective, they would abandon the scheme too as no money is left to pay 73 
them. By the same token, PES intermediaries, for instance, non-government organizations 74 
(NGOs), would lose credibility due to their “unfulfilled promises” of ES delivery and would 75 
have their reputation at risk (Fisher and Brown, 2014). This hypothesis implies that ES 76 
monitoring, evaluation and reporting are strongly needed to produce the right evidence to 77 
keep payers and providers on board (e.g. Naeem et al., 2015). 78 
However, if additional motivations, perceptions and values are in place, then the 79 
assumptions made in theory regarding expectations from participants and the importance of 80 
evidence of ES improvement may be questioned. Preliminary evidence suggests that 81 
providers and payers may indeed be motivated by a plurality of reasons. Recent studies have 82 
proposed that intrinsic motivations, for example, a desire to “care for the land” (Méndez-83 
López et al., 2015, p. 695), or the “warm-glow effect” (Andreoni, 1990), can play a strong 84 
role on conservation schemes engagement by land owners (Ezzine-de-blas et al., 2015; Kits 85 
et al., 2014; Kosoy et al., 2008; Zanella et al., 2014). In the same way, a mixture of 86 
motivations, for example, green marketing or to maintain reputational capital, may be in 87 
place when corporate leaders decide to invest in environmental programs (Babiak and 88 
Trendafilova, 2011; Chin et al., 2013; Ditlev-simonsen and Midttun, 2011; Hemingway and 89 
Maclagan, 2004). Further disentangling the motivations of providers and payers, as well as 90 
intermediaries can not only shed light on alignments and misalignments across each group 91 
of actors, but most importantly contribute to a better understanding of the long-term 92 
sustainability of PES schemes, even in the presence of high uncertainty about their impact.  93 
 
 
In this paper, we explore motivations and expectations of actors involved in PES 94 
schemes in order to assess the importance of impact evidence in the scheme long-term 95 
durability. We compare the perspectives of three groups involved in four water-related PES 96 
schemes in Colombia: intermediaries, landowners (providers), and major donors (payers). 97 
We focus our questions on whether additional motivations from payers and providers would 98 
play a role in their engagement and permanence in the scheme; if payers demand evidence 99 
of PES impacts on ES provision/maintenance; and if intermediaries feel in the need to 100 






Study sites 105 
 This study was conducted in four water-related PES schemes (here also called payments for 106 
watershed services - PWS) in Colombia: 107 
1) “Agua Somos” (Chisacá and Mugroso river watersheds - tributaries of Tunjuelo river; 108 
located in Usme, Bogotá D.C.); 109 
2) Asociación de Usuarios de Agua del Río Bolo – “ASOBOLO” (Aguaclara river 110 
watershed - tributary of Bolo River; located in Pradera and Palmira municipalities, 111 
Valle del Cauca Department); 112 
3) Compensación por Servicios Ambientales Hidricos Cuenca del Río Cali - “CSAH Cali” 113 
(Felidia and Pichindé rivers watersheds – tributaries of Cali River; located in Cali 114 
municipality, Valle del Cauca Department); 115 
4) “Cuenca Verde” (Chico river watershed - tributary of Riogrande River; located in 116 
Belmira municipality, Antioquia) (Figure 1). 117 
  The selection of schemes was mainly based on data and literature accessibility, 118 
availability and openness of key informants, and the safety in the field. We conducted a 119 
preliminary fieldwork of two weeks in January 2015, followed by a 6-months fieldwork from 120 
January to June 2016. The study was based on semi-structured interviews, questionnaires, 121 
participant observation, and literature review of reports and related documents from the 122 
organizations managing the schemes. We followed intermediaries in their daily work in the 123 
field and office, and attended a major conference with the presence of PWS managers and 124 
payers from three of the studied schemes (June 13th to 17th, 2016, Bogotá D.C.). Interviews 125 
and questionnaires were applied to three groups: providers, intermediaries, and major 126 
payers. Here we consider PWS intermediaries as “actors who take on roles that connect and 127 
 
 
facilitate transactions between buyers and sellers” (Huber-Stearns et al., 2013, p. 105). In 128 
the studied cases they are civil society organizations (e.g. water user associations, 129 
environmental non-government organizations). Providers in these schemes are considered 130 
those who live in areas that are strategic for the provision of water resources and have 131 
voluntarily agreed to participate. They are usually small landowners living in the upstream 132 
area of the watersheds. Payers in the four schemes are mostly private companies, public 133 
companies and environmental authorities, although individuals also pay a small contribution 134 
as water users in one of the schemes (ASOBOLO case). 135 
  Among the four schemes, two of them (Agua Somos and Cuenca Verde) were created 136 
as “water funds” within the frame of the Latin-American Alliance for Water Funds, an 137 
initiative led mainly by the international non-governmental organization (NGO) The Nature 138 
Conservancy (TNC) (Calvache et al., 2012; Goldman-Benner et al., 2012). ASOBOLO, in turn, 139 
is a water user association created in the early-90’s to manage the water resources shared 140 
by different users in the Rio Bolo watershed, mainly from the sugarcane production sector 141 
(Munoz Escobar et al., 2013). In the late-2000’s ASOBOLO joined an initiative also framed as 142 
a water fund together with several other water user associations from the same region, 143 
forming what is now called Fondo Agua por la Vida y la Sostenibilidad (FAVS) (Moreno-144 
Padilla, 2016). ASOBOLO receives funds from FAVS and other programs such as the 145 
“Conservation Incentives”, a finished 5-years project funded by The Netherlands and 146 
managed by the NGO Fondo Patrimonio Natural (Table 1). The same project incentivized and 147 
funded the creation of CSAH Cali putting together local government agencies and private 148 
sector to fund conservation practices in upstream catchments that provide water to the city 149 
of Cali (See references in Table 1 for additional details). 150 
 
 
The PWS conservation activities undertaken in the watersheds through the schemes 151 
under study started quite recently; from 2010 onwards (Table 1). In all four schemes, 152 
conservation practices are mostly concentrated in river and spring fencing for protection 153 
against the cattle in upstream lands (Table 2). Some of the initiatives (e.g. ASOBOLO) also 154 
include implementation of live fences and agrosilvopastoral systems, cattle rotational 155 
grazing, and other farm practices to reduce the impact of cattle on the soil of mountainous 156 
areas. In order to set those practices, the intermediaries establish voluntary conservation 157 
agreements with each upstream landowner. The agreements include payments to the 158 
landowners, usually in-kind, including technical assistance to improve productivity in the 159 
farm, materials for the conservation practices, and farm infrastructure improvement. Among 160 
the studied cases, CSAH Cali is the only program that pays also in cash. 161 
 162 
  163 
 
 
Table 1: Description of the four PWS schemes: literature references, watershed location, intermediaries involved, major payers, year in which 164 
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Abbreviations: 1Major payers as mentioned by interviewed intermediaries. In addition to these, there are several others that contribute with smaller funds. AMVA – Area Metropolitana del Valle 166 
de Aburrá; ASOCAÑA - Asociación de Cultivadores de Caña de Azúcar de Colombia; ASOBOLO – Asociación de Usuarios de las Aguas Superficiales y Subterraneas de la Cuenca del Río Bolo; 167 
CORNARE – Corporación Autónoma Regional de las Cuencas de los Ríos Negro y Nare; CVC - Corporación Autónoma Regional del Valle del Cauca; EAAB – Empresa de Acueducto, Alcantarillado y 168 
Aseo de Bogotá; EMCali – Empresas Municipales de Cali; EPM – Empresas Publicas de Medellín; FEMSA - Fomento Económico Mexicano, S.A.B. de C.V.; PN - Fundación Patrimonio Natural; SDA - 169 
Secretaria Distrital de Ambiente; TNC - The Nature Conservancy; *Refers to the year in which activities started in Aguaclara watershed only. ASOBOLO itself was launched in 1993 and started 170 




Table 2: Target ES, activities performed in the field, type of payment and payments for each PWS scheme. 173 















River fencing, tree planting, 
cattle rotational grazing systems In-kind 
Energy saving wood stove, cattle drinking 
fountains, materials for fences, seedlings, small-scale 
poultry systems, improvement of pastures, 
technical assistance 





springs protection, tree planting, 
forest protection, farm septic tanks, 
agrosilvopastoral systems, cattle 
rotational grazing systems, 
farm live fences. 
In-kind 
Material for fences, seedlings, septic tanks, financial support 
for implementing forest reserves, community vegetable 
gardens, fruit trees, environmental education in schools, 




(17,172 ha)4 Water quality 





Cattle drinking fountains, materials for fences, 
bridges for cattle, improvement of paddocks, forage for 
cattle, compost systems, septic tank, 













Cash, materials for fences, seedlings, 
technical assistance, environmental education projects, 
vegetable gardens, sewage treatment system 
Sources: 1It refers to the type of benefit that has been provided to the land owners who are implementing conservation practices in their properties. 2Calculated from digital elevation map, 174 
upstream Chisacá reservoir; 3CENICAÑA (Centro de Investigación de la Caña de Azúcar de Colombia) technical staff – personal communication; 4Calculated from digital elevation map, upstream 175 






Figure 1. Schematic location of the studied water-related PES Schemes 180 
 181 
Questionnaires and Interviews 182 
 Initial interviews with key informants were used to understand the history and 183 
context of each scheme and to support the design of the questionnaires. Questionnaires 184 
were structured in questions that combined selection of options, ranking, and degree of 185 
agreement with some statements. For questions regarding degree of agreement a Likert 186 
scale of 0 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree) was applied. Providers answered their 187 
questionnaires in the field. Intermediaries answered their questionnaires either directly in 188 
the field or online through an internet link sent to their email address after permission 189 
requested in person or by phone. Questionnaires for major payers were applied in the field 190 
during the interviews, through teleconference meetings or via email after contact by phone, 191 
depending on the availability of the respondents. Semi-structured interviews followed the 192 
 
 
same topics of the questionnaires in a more flexible approach in order to capture each 193 
group's perspectives, differences, opinions, and explanations for their choices and to cross-194 
check the answers from questionnaires. 195 
 The structure of the questionnaires started with a session with general information 196 
about the respondent and followed topics such as: motivations to participate in the scheme, 197 
general expectations based on their own roles and perceptions about the functioning of the 198 
scheme and the environmental changes and/or improvements. In addition, the following 199 
topics were added according to each respondent group: (1) providers: role of the payment 200 
as an incentive for entering the scheme; (2) intermediaries: importance of environmental 201 
monitoring, importance of reporting impact evidence, perception of expectations and 202 
demands from payers; (3) payers: water-related environmental services of interest, 203 
importance of evidence of the achievement of the PES goals for the maintenance of the 204 
payment, expectations on impact monitoring and reporting. The initial interviews with the 205 
three groups provided the statements used for the agreement questions and the list of 206 
motivations of providers and payers. After selecting the motivations from the list with the 207 
option of adding new ones, these two groups ranked up to three of their most important 208 
motivations. We then analyzed all answers in a lumped way. 209 
 210 
Characteristics of questionnaires' respondents 211 
Intermediaries group: 25 individuals answered the intermediaries' questionnaire. 212 
The questionnaire included intermediaries working not only in the study sites reported here 213 
but also in additional PES schemes in Colombia. Three respondents were involved in 214 
schemes in Colombia and in other Latin-American countries as part of an international 215 
program. Most of the respondents were from NGOs. Other respondents included: 216 
 
 
representatives of local water users’ associations, representatives of other civil associations, 217 
researchers and technicians belonging to local research centers involved in monitoring PES 218 
schemes, and one representative from a regional environmental authority. Table 3 219 
summarizes the characteristics of the respondents and their organizations in terms of the 220 
roles played in the scheme in which they are involved as intermediaries. 221 
 222 
Table 3: Individual role and organizational role of  intermediaries’ respondents. 223 
     
Individual Role in the Scheme n (%)  Organizational Roles in the Scheme n (%)* 
Supporting Technician 9 (36)  Design 15 (60) 
Manager 6 (24)  Support 14 (56) 
Scientist in charge of research 5 (20)  Implementation 10 (40) 
Mixed role: scientist/technician 2 (8)  Management 4 (16) 
Mixed role: manager/technician 2 (8)  Evaluation 1 (4) 
Other 1 (4)    
     
     
Professional Background n (%)  Organizational Roles related to  Monitoring n (%)* 
Biologist 7 (28)  Funding 15 (60) 
Economist 4 (16)  Getting secondary data from third parts 15 (60) 
Agricultural engineer 4 (16)  Direct monitoring of env. indicators 14 (56) 
Forest engineer 2 (8)  Logistics for monitoring in the field 13 (52) 
Agronomy engineer 2 (8)  Processing monitoring data and report 13 (52) 
Sanitary engineer 1 (4)  No role on monitoring 1 (4) 
Environmental engineer 1 (4)    
Social worker 1 (4)    
Environmental manager 1 (4)    
Oceanographer 1 (4)    
Environmental technician 1 (4)    
     
Total of respondents: 25. * Non-exclusive roles, i.e. the organization may perform different 224 
roles in the same scheme. 225 
  226 
 Payer’s group: 15 individuals answered the payers' questionnaire. Respondents belonging to 227 
the payers group were representatives of several types of organizations/firms, including: 228 
two public water supply companies; private companies from the beverage, sugarcane and 229 
dairy production sectors, a restaurant, a health clinic, a lawyers firm, an infrastructure 230 
company and one service company; and one development organization acting as payer. 231 
Respondents reported both in kind and cash investments to the scheme (Table 4). The 232 
following types of financial participation were reported: annual payments (n=6); every 3-6 233 
months (n=3); a one-time payment (n=2); punctual payments through projects in the form of 234 
 
 
contracts with the intermediaries (n=3); no payments in cash (n=2). Most of the payers are 235 
users of the water from the watershed that they are paying for conservation (Table 4). 236 
 237 
Table 4: Use of water from the watershed by the 15 paying organizations and type of 238 
payment provided to PES schemes (non-exclusive categories). 239 
     
Use of water from the watershed n (%)  Type of payment provided for the scheme n (%) 
Incorporated in products 7 (46.7)  Cash* 13 (86.7) 
Public water supply 4 (26.7)  Materials (e.g. construction, technology) 3 (20) 
Private water supply 3 (20)  Logistic Services (e.g. transportation) 2 (13.3) 
Use of water for industrial processes 4 (26.7)  Technical assistance (e.g. laboratory, GIS support) 4 (26.7) 
No use of water 2 (13.3)  Other types 3 (20) 
Other 1 (6.7)    
     
* Note that cash could be used by the intermediaries to cover implementation costs (materials, staff…) and/or converted into in-kind 240 
payments. The only case where cash was entirely disbursed as such to the providers is the CSAH Cali. 241 
  242 
Providers group: 72 individuals from a total of 159 providers (45%) from the four PES 243 
schemes answered the providers' questionnaire. The distribution of respondents in the four 244 
schemes was: 12 respondents out of 35 providers from Agua Somos (34%); 30 respondents 245 
out of 56 providers from ASOBOLO (54%); 18 respondents out of 22 providers from Cuenca 246 
Verde (82%); 12 out of 46 respondents from CSAH Cali (26%) (Table 5).  247 
  Landowners living in farms inherited from relatives are the majority of respondents. 248 
A small fraction is not owners but long-term tenants. Most of the respondents have lived 249 
their entire life in the region, some of them in the nearby city. They are usually farmers who 250 
depend on agricultural production as their main income. Cattle ranching is the most 251 
common use of land. Table 5 summarizes the main characteristics of the respondents among 252 
providers.  253 
  254 
 
 
Table 5: Main characteristics of questionnaire respondents among providers and their land 255 
properties.  256 
Scheme 
Characteristics of providers’ respondents 
Number of 
Respondents 
 n (%) 
Average 




type of property 
Main land use 
Avg. number 
of years with 
signed  
 PES agreements 
Agua Somos 12 (48) 18.7 (7.1) Inherited  Cattle ranching,  potato crops 2.2 
ASOBOLO 30 (54) 8.8 (3.3) Acquired Cattle ranching,  fruit production 4.5 
CSAH Cali 12 (26) 19.4 (4.5) Acquired 




Cuenca Verde 18 (82) 41 (8.5) Inherited  Cattle ranching 1.1 
CSAH Cali 12 (26) 19.4 (4.5) Acquired 





 This section presents the results grouped in four core topics: (1) motivations to engage in a 258 
PES scheme from payers and providers’ perspective; (2) importance of reporting PES impacts 259 
from the intermediaries and payers’ perspectives; (3) payment upon evidence of PES 260 
impacts; (4) environmental indicators of interest. 261 
1. Motivations	to	engage	in	a	PES	scheme	262 
Payers: during the interviews, payers reported different motivations to engage in PES 263 
schemes. The most frequently mentioned was the protection of water resources from which 264 
they depend directly or indirectly. In addition, several interviewees have mentioned that 265 
their companies have environmental and social responsibility policies and that the schemes 266 
fit into their goals. A representative of a multinational company emphasized that there is a 267 
new generation of businessmen with a newer mentality towards environmental issues such 268 
as climate change and water resources. According to him, with potential water shortages in 269 
 
 
the future, companies cannot count only on efficient use anymore - there must be combined 270 
strategies. 271 
Interviewees from two different water supply companies had different perspectives 272 
regarding the conservation schemes. The first mentioned that the scheme was a way to 273 
compensate the municipalities from which they have been withdrawing water for decades. 274 
Now there was a need to invest back in these communities and, therefore, the focus of their 275 
participation was the social aspect more than the environmental one. The representative 276 
from the second company, on the other hand, emphasized the protection of water resources 277 
as the fundamental reason as the company is in charge of the water treatment and 278 
distribution service as well as electricity supply from hydropower. Legal requirements were 279 
also mentioned: Colombian Law n. 99/1993 requires that energy supply companies pay a tax 280 
to environmental authorities and municipalities. 281 
Several schemes in Colombia have been set in regions with long term environmental 282 
conflicts of different levels, for example, the Valle del Cauca where sugarcane producers are 283 
great water users. In other regions, small landowners are in conflict with environmental 284 
authorities and water supply companies over land use in upstream areas due to impacts on 285 
springs and creeks. Therefore, from the perspective of many companies acting as payers, 286 
their participation is also a way to reduce conflicts by investing back in those communities. 287 
The questionnaires confirmed several aspects mentioned during the interviews. ES 288 
improvement (e.g. better water quality, better regulation of flows) was selected as one of 289 
the motivations by all respondents from the payers group (n=15) (Table 6). The second most 290 
selected motivation was corporate socio-environmental policy (n=12). Following, corporate 291 
image/green marketing and improvement of private-public relations (e.g. with local 292 
communities) were selected by 7 respondents each.   293 
 
 
Table 6: Motivations selection and ranking by payers (absolute values followed by 294 
percentage relative to total of answers). First value column refers to the number of times 295 
the motivation was selected in the list, including when they did not count among the most 296 
important ones. The following value columns refer to the number of times the motivation 297 
was ranked as first, second and third most important. Total number of answers is shown in 298 





# selected 1st 
total=15 
n (%) 
# selected 2nd 
total=12 
n (%) 
# selected 3rd 
total=11 
n (%) 
A ES improvement 15 (100) 10 (66.7) 3 (25) 0 
B Corporate social-environmental responsibility (CSR)* 12 (80) 4 (26.7) 4 (33.3) 1 (9.1) 
C Corporate image, i.e. green marketing 7 (46.7) 0 0 5 (45.5) 
D Improvement of private-public relations 7 (46.7) 0 0 2 (18.2) 
E Part of the fundamental goals of the organization 3 (20) 1 (6.7) 0 0 
F Part of a mitigation process of our production chain 3 (20) 0 2 (16.7) 1 (9.1) 
G Restoration of areas affected by the organization. 2 (13.3) 0 1 (8.3) 0 
H Sustainability index  in stock market 3 (20) 0 0 0 
I Taxes deduction 2 (13.3) 0 1 (8.3) 0 
J Demanded by shareholders 2 (13.3) 0 1 (8.3) 1 (9.1) 
K Environmental compensation required by law 1 (6.7) 0 0 1 (9.1) 
L Environmental investment required by law 1 (6.7) 0 0 0 
M Part of the organization' duties according to the law 1 (6.7) 0 0 0 
N ES was already part of their business tradition 1 (6.7) 0 0 0 
O Facilitate environmental certification 0 0 0 0 
P ES is incorporated in business 0 0 0 0 
*Corporate Social Responsibility here is understood as “context-specific organizational actions and policies that 300 
take into account stakeholders’ expectations and the triple bottom line of economic, social, and environmental 301 
performance (Aguinis and Glavas, 2012, p. 933).” 302 
  303 
 In sequence, payers’ respondents ranked the first, second, and third most important 304 
motivations for them (Table 6). The first most important motivations were: ES improvement 305 
(n=10), corporate social responsibility (n=4), and ES as part of the goals of the organization 306 
(n=1). The second most important motivations were: corporate social responsibility (n=4), ES 307 
improvement (n=3), and impact mitigation (n=2). Restoration of areas affected by the 308 
organization, taxes deduction and shareholders’ demands were selected as second most 309 
important motivation by one respondent each. The third most important motivations were: 310 
 
 
corporate image/green marketing (n=5), improvement of private-public relations (n=2), 311 
corporate social responsibility (n=1), mitigation (n=1), compensation required by law (n=1), 312 
and shareholders’ demand (n=1). 313 
  Although not identified as initial motivations by all respondents, the following items 314 
were indicated by some of the respondents during interviews as non-expected benefits 315 
gained after their engagement in PES schemes: better private-public relations, better 316 
corporate image, tax deductions, internal sustainability indicators, sustainability index in 317 
stock markets, environmental awareness. 318 
Providers: during the interviews, providers mentioned several motivations for 319 
engaging in the conservation scheme. Among the mentioned ones, they have said that the 320 
scheme represented progress to them and that it provided learning experience. Many have 321 
mentioned the environmental consciousness as a motivation for engaging, relating it to the 322 
protection of water resources and some concerns with future dry seasons. Some 323 
interviewees mentioned that they want to protect water resources that are strategic for 324 
their farm for the sake of those who will inherit it. Personal conviction and economic 325 
incentives (even in the in-kind form) were also mentioned as motivations. Interviews and 326 
participant observation led to the reflection that the main motivations can be interpreted as 327 
an intention to stay in the territory maintaining or improving their livelihoods. 328 
Interviews with Agua Somos providers showed that similar initiatives had already 329 
been undertaken in the region some years ago and that helped them to feel motivated to 330 
participate in Agua Somos. It was reported that when some landowners first started 331 
engaging with Agua Somos, others observed the benefits gained by them through the 332 
program and decided to participate, a behavior also observed by Goldman-Benner et al. 333 
(2012) and described as a social spillover effect. Participants that engaged later also had the 334 
 
 
chance to observe the commitment of the intermediary actor with the first participants 335 
allowing them to feel more confident in the process. 336 
Additional benefits later perceived by some of the providers were the farm and 337 
landscape aesthetics. Several interviewees mentioned that the farm looks better managed 338 
and not abandoned when receiving the interventions proposed by the intermediaries, which 339 
could be interpreted as an expression of perceived added value to the property. River fences 340 
were also pointed as beneficial for avoiding accidents with the cattle such as when the cows 341 
fall from steep areas. Other interviewees mentioned that the planted trees would favor 342 
avoiding high temperatures during the day by providing shadow for the cattle. Several 343 
interviewees mentioned the importance of protecting the springs in their farms for their 344 
own sake. One interviewee translated that into a clear statement: “a farm without water has 345 
no value”. Extra income provided by the fruit trees planted in one of the schemes was also 346 
mentioned as perceived benefit. From participant observation, it was possible to realize that 347 
several reasons reported by providers were being disseminated by intermediaries during 348 
negotiations as a way to create environmental awareness. 349 
Providers were asked what they know about the reasons why some landowners 350 
decided not to engage in the schemes. Several interviewees reported that those who are not 351 
participating believe that the fenced land (e.g. for riparian forest recovery) would be later 352 
expropriated and taken from their control. Others pointed that resistant landowners were 353 
worried about not being able to use the water for their cattle anymore. 354 
The questionnaire phase started with a list of statements that were taken from the 355 
interviews. Providers were asked whether they agree with statements connected to their 356 
motivations and expectations in participating in the scheme (Table 7). Answers supported 357 
the notion of an existing interest in water resources conservation (item B) but also to a 358 
 
 
desire to improve their livelihoods (item A and C). Results from items D and E showed that 359 
the majority of providers would have participated in similar conservation schemes even 360 
without direct economic benefits for themselves (in kind or cash payments), confirming 361 
other statements in which it becomes clear that providers understand the protection of 362 
water resources as a beneficial for themselves anyway. Most providers also recognize that 363 
the effects of the schemes will require some years to be observed (item F). 364 
From a list of potential motivations extracted from interviews, respondents were 365 
asked to select those that they had. More than half of respondents pointed to the 366 
expectation of a beneficial effect of the scheme on the water quality/quantity (Table 8, item 367 
C) and half of respondents indicated a concern with water resources conservation (item A), 368 
which may be explained by the importance attributed to water as a factor of production. 369 
Almost half of the respondents reported the potential for improvement of farm productivity 370 
as one of their motivations (item B). 37% of respondents also reported to have been 371 
concerned with conservation even before the proposition of the scheme (item D). Only 6 372 
among 71 providers (8.6%) reported that one of the motivations to engage was that the 373 
economic incentives proposed by the intermediaries caught their attention (item K). More 374 
common motivations than economic incentive were: enjoying the idea of having a protected 375 
forest in the farm (item E); shadow provided by trees for the cattle (item F); and farm’s 376 
aesthetics (item G) (Table 8). 377 
Concerns with water resources conservation figured out as the first most important 378 
motivation for 30% of respondents, while improvement of farmers productivity assumed the 379 
same position for 25.7%. Expectations with improvement of water quality/quantity assumed 380 
the second place as most important motivation for 20% and third place for 27.5% of 381 




Table 7: Summary of providers’ answers to agreement questions. 384 












   n (%) 
A This conservation project will improve a lot the productivity conditions of my farm. 71 3 (4.3) 0 11 (15.7) 25 (35.7) 31 (44.3) 
B I have always been interested in water resources conservation, even before this project. 72 2 (2.8) 0 6 (8.3) 12 (16.7) 52 (72.2) 
C Environmental concerns are important, but it is more important to obtain the benefits of the scheme for my farm. 72 12 (16.7) 8 (11.1) 25 (34.7) 12 (16.7) 15 (20.8) 
D I would participate in any environmental project, even without economic benefits. 71 1 (1.4) 2 (2.8) 5 (7.0) 21 (29.6) 42 (59.2) 
E I would have participated in this scheme, even without having received any economic incentive for that. 72 1 (1.4) 3 (4.2) 5 (6.9) 25 (34.7) 38 (52.8) 




Table 8: Ranking of providers’ motivations. First number column shows the total number of 388 
times the motivation was included among the three most important ones and percentage 389 
among respondents. Next number columns report the number of times the motivation was 390 
ranked as first, second and third most important.  391 













  n (%) 
A ... I began to feel concerned with water resources conservation 35 (50.0) 21 (30.0) 11 (15.7) 3 (4.3) 
B ... I thought the scheme would improve my farm’s productivity 30 (42.9) 18 (25.7) 6 (8.6) 6 (8.7) 
C ... I thought the scheme would improve water quality/quantity 44 (62.9) 11 (15.7) 14 (20.0) 19 (27.5) 
D ... I was already concerned with conservation before this scheme 26 (37.1) 8 (11.8) 7 (10.0) 11 (15.9) 
E ... I like the forest and I wanted to have a bit in my farm 20 (28.6) 4 (5.7) 9 (12.9) 7 (10.1) 
F ... With more trees my cattle would have more shadow 14 (20.0) 2 (2.9) 6 (8.6) 6 (8.7) 
G 
... I believed the farm would appear more organized/beautiful with the 
interventions proposed 11 (15.7) 4 (5.7) 4 (5.7) 3 (4.3) 
H ... I like that others are concerned with our community 13 (18.6) 1 (1.4) 7 (10.0) 5 (7.2) 
I 
... In our community we all are interested in participating in 
environmental projects 3 (4.3) 1 (1.4) 0 (0) 2 (2.9) 
J ... My neighbors were already in the scheme 4 (5.7) 0 (0) 4 (5.7) 0 (0) 
K ... The economic incentives caught my attention 6 (8,6) 0 (0) 1 (1.4) 5 (7.2) 





 Intermediaries: During the questionnaire phase, intermediaries were asked whether they 394 
feel it is important to report/communicate actual PES impacts on water-related ES (e.g. 395 
water turbidity reduction, river discharge increment, etc.) to payers (Table 9). 96% of 396 
respondents (n=24) totally agreed that it is important. Following, they were asked whether 397 
they feel that payers expect them to demonstrate PES impacts on water-related ES. The 398 
question did not include the expectation over indicators of activities performed (e.g. number 399 
of planted trees), but only indicators regarding water-related ES. 68% of respondents (n=17) 400 
totally agreed, while 24% (n=6) mostly agreed. Following, intermediaries were asked 401 
whether they agree that demonstrating PES impacts on the target water-related ES was 402 
important for the reputation of their organizations (Table 9). Among respondents, 68% 403 
(n=17) totally agreed and 20% (n=5) mostly agreed. These answers highlighted the 404 
importance attributed by the intermediaries to the effective communication processes 405 
among stakeholders.  406 
Interviews confirmed the intermediaries’ concerns on proving the effectiveness of 407 
their schemes in terms of water-related ES indicators. Interviewees expressed that they are 408 
concerned about demonstrating PES impacts on ES not only for the sake of their reputation, 409 
but also because: (1) they want to keep payers on board, (2) they want to attract more 410 
potential payers by demonstrating the effectiveness of their schemes, (3) they want to keep 411 
good relations with the providers who entered the scheme motivated by environmental 412 
awareness, (4) they feel personally engaged with the cause and want the schemes to be 413 
successful. It was also observed in the field that NGOs and civil associations employ several 414 
technicians and managers to work in the PES scheme and lack of funding would mean 415 
unemployment for many of them. Therefore, evidence of an effective conservation scheme 416 
 
 
also supports more stable working conditions. Another reason mentioned by interviewees 417 
from one intermediary organization is that their organization portraits itself as a “science-418 
based” NGO, therefore, evidence of ES outcomes is important for them to keep their 419 
tradition and image. 420 
 421 
Table 9: Summary of intermediaries’ respondents answers to agreement questions. 422 
id Agreement Statement # Answers Totally  Disagree 
Partially  
Disagree 






   n (%) 
A 
It is important to communicate PES 
impacts/outcomes to those who 
are supporting and paying this 
scheme 
25 0 0 0 1 (4.0) 24 (96.0) 
B 
Those who are supporting and paying this 
scheme expect us to 
demonstrate PES impacts 
25 0 1 (4.0) 1 (4.0) 6 (24.0) 17 (68.0) 
C 
Those who are supporting and paying this 
scheme only pay under the 
condition of PES impacts being 
demonstrated 
25 6 (24.0) 2 (8.0) 9 (36.0) 4 (16.0) 4 (16.0) 
D 
I think that demonstrating PES impacts is 
important for the reputation of 
those in charge of the schemes 
25 0 1 (4.0) 2 (8.0) 5 (20.0) 17 (68.0) 
E 
PES schemes are too new to be able to 
generate impacts that could be 
detected on water-related ES 
25 1 (4.0) 1 (4.0) 7 (28.0) 1 (4.0) 15 (60.0) 
  423 
 Payers: payers’ respondents were asked how much they agree that their organizations 424 
require regular reports of environmental indicators monitoring from PES intermediaries 425 
(Table 10, item E). Most respondents totally agreed (n=9, 60%). Respondents were then 426 
asked how much they agree that they only require reports about the activities performed by 427 
the PES intermediaries, but not about the impacts of these activities on the environmental 428 
services of interest (item F). Most of the respondents disagreed (66.7%), while 26,6% agreed. 429 
These answers were similar to those obtained in several interviews with payers and 430 
intermediaries. However, although payers are interested in checking out the actual PES 431 
outcomes in terms of ES, several of them were aware that it would take longer to see the 432 
 
 
effects of the scheme and that monitoring could be expensive, counterbalancing their 433 
expectation of receiving full reports about the impacts of these activities on ES. 434 
   435 
Table 10: Summary of payers’ answers to agreement questions. 436 











   n (%) 
A We believe that ES will improve with the PES scheme 15 0 0 1 (6.7) 5 (33.3) 9 (60) 
B 
The most important motivation for 
engaging was the 
improvement of 
environmental service 
15 0 0 2 (13.3) 2 (13.3) 11 (73.3) 
C 
We only pay under the condition of 
PES impacts being 
demonstrated 
15 6 (40) 2 (13.3) 1 (6.7) 5 (33.3) 1 (6.7) 
D 
If PES impacts on environmental 
services are not proven 
with the time, we would 
stop paying for the scheme 
15 4 (26.7) 2 (13.3) 2 (13.3) 4 (26.7) 3 (20) 
E 
We require reports with monitoring 
results of PES impacts on 
environmental services 
regularly 
15 1 (6.7) 1 (6.7) 1 (6.7) 3 (20) 9 (60) 
F 
We only require reports of activities 
performed, not of PES 
impacts on environmental 
services 
15 7 (46.7) 3 (20) 1 (6.7) 2 (13.3) 2 (13.3) 
  437 
3. Payment	upon	evidence	of	PES	impacts	438 
 Intermediaries: intermediaries were asked whether they agree that payers pay (or will keep 439 
paying) under the condition that PES managers provide proofs of PES impacts on ES (Table 440 
9). This question raised no clear consensus: 36% of respondents (n=9) neither agreed nor 441 
disagreed, while those who mostly or totally disagreed summed 32% (n=8), and the same 442 
was obtained for those who mostly or totally agreed (32%, n=8). During the interviews, 443 
questions regarding this point also raised uncertainty among intermediaries. However, most 444 
of them expressed that although reporting progress in terms of PES impacts on water-445 
related ES was important and required by payers, payers do not appear to be willing to leave 446 
 
 
the scheme in case no proof was delivered. When questioned about potential reasons, 447 
several interviewees pointed that although payers were interested in the ES, they also 448 
engaged in the scheme because of other motivations. Table S1 presents their opinion about 449 
potential motivations from payers (separated in two categories only, private and public 450 
companies). 451 
  Interviews revealed that intermediaries understand that large companies acting as 452 
payers, in general, are aware that several factors are not under control on a conservation 453 
scheme and that the outcomes may not be the expected ones. Even so, they would be able 454 
to handle it through other investments in case they depend on these water resources. For 455 
example, in case reduction of turbidity is not achieved for a certain water source they could 456 
pay for new water treatment facilities to overcome the issue. According to one 457 
representative from an intermediary, not achieving the ES goals would not be a major issue 458 
for big companies; for instance, he mentioned, if a beverage company does not obtain 459 
better water quality, any additional cost on water treatment required for production would 460 
be passed to consumers through an increase in price. The respondent did not mention any 461 
effect that it could have on the competition with other beverage companies. 462 
Therefore, according to the intermediaries, other benefits that big payers have while participating in 463 
PES projects would explain their permanence in the schemes, such as stating their 464 
commitment with environmental projects each year in a corporate sustainability report. 465 
Intermediaries did not express the same perception for small payers. 466 
  Some intermediary representatives also expressed that their responsibility over 467 
providing clear evidence of ES benefits out of the conservation practices are limited by the 468 
fact that payers usually pay for conservation but they do not pay for research or monitoring. 469 
 
 
Therefore, payers would not be in the position to demand clear evidence from 470 
intermediaries. 471 
  Payers: Payer’s representatives were then asked how much they agree that their 472 
payments were conditional on evidence of ES improvement to be provided by intermediaries 473 
(Table 10, item C). The question divided respondents; 8 out of 15 respondents disagreed 474 
(53.3%) and 6 of them agreed (40%), while 1 neither agreed nor disagreed. Average value for 475 
this question was 2.53, indicating a trend towards disagreeing. Following, payers were asked 476 
how much they agree that their organizations would leave the scheme in case no ES 477 
improvement is proven over time (item D). This question also divided respondents. 4 478 
respondents totally disagreed, 2 mostly disagreed, 1 neither agreed nor disagreed, 4 mostly 479 
agreed, and 3 totally agreed. Average value reached for these answers was 3.0, indicating 480 
that answers were slightly balanced towards agreeing with the statement. 481 
During interviews, payers indicated in their answers that ES improvement is 482 
important and is the main driver for their engagement. However, most of them have 483 
entered the scheme for additional reasons, confirming the results presented in Table 6 and 484 
interviews with intermediaries. Several interviewees expressed that they would not stop 485 
paying in case ES improvement is not proven. Reasons for that included: (a) some 486 
understanding that water flows in a watershed is a result of complex processes and 487 
monitoring is costly; (b) payers invest part of their money for environmental compensation 488 
and other legal requirements and, therefore, engaging in a PES scheme fits those 489 
requirements; (c) additional motivations pay-off; (d) big companies are somehow used to 490 
fund risky investments and PES costs are not large enough to compromise their budget. One 491 
water supply company representative stated that evidence of ES outcomes is highly 492 
important, but they are aware, from their own experience, that a good hydrologic 493 
 
 
monitoring system is too expensive. Interviewees from another water supply company 494 
attributed less importance to evidence of ES outcomes, in part because their participation in 495 
the scheme was much more a response to a social demand than to the need of improving 496 
watershed conditions. 497 
For one water supply company, the PES scheme was part of a whole strategy on 498 
conservation that was already established in the company’s core functioning. Therefore, 499 
even if the PES scheme does not achieve the expected outcomes, other internal 500 
conservation projects would play a role on satisfying environmental concerns. Another 501 
respondent from a beverage company expressed that although the outcomes of such 502 
schemes were highly uncertain their company already had environmental concerns as part 503 
of their core values. Moreover, as in any other investment, companies are used to take risks 504 
and deal with uncertain situations. 505 
 506 
4. Environmental	and	social	indicators	of	interest	507 
Payers: payers representatives received a list of potential environmental and social 508 
indicators and were asked to choose the ones that their organization had required reports 509 
from intermediaries. In addition, they had the option of adding new ones to the list. In 510 
sequence, they were asked to choose the first, second and third most important indicators 511 
(Table S2). All 15 respondents selected the indicators, however just 12 indicated their first, 512 
and 9 chose their second and third most important ones. The most selected indicators were 513 
A to E. While indicators A to D refer to the conservation practices performed in the field (e.g. 514 
area under vegetation protection, number of planted trees, number of protected springs), E 515 
refers to a social indicator (number of families receiving payments). None of these five 516 
indicators is related to the ES outcomes, i.e. the ES maintenance or improvement obtained 517 
 
 
from the conservation practices. However, when asked about their first most important 518 
indicator, 33.3% of respondents (n=4) said river discharge increment (item G), would be their 519 
choice. Area under vegetation protection (item A) follows as first choice for 25% of 520 
respondents (n=3). Area under vegetation protection and sediment load reduction (item I) 521 
were chosen as second most important motivation by 2 respondents each. Number of 522 
planted trees (item B) was chosen by 4 respondents (44.4%) as the third most important 523 
motivation. 524 
The fact that the most important indicators selected by payers are not about ES 525 
outcomes but are rather proxies associated to farmer´s land use practices and their impact 526 
on the land/vegetation could be due to three potential explanations drawn from interviews: 527 
(i) Payers strongly believe in a positive interaction between vegetation protection 528 
and water-related ES maintenance; 529 
(ii) payers are more inclined to use those indicators as numbers to their annual 530 
sustainability reports for their clients, government, shareholders or local community; for 531 
that matter indirect indicators of conservation, i.e. proxies, would be sufficient; 532 
(iii) at least part of the payers are aware that ES monitoring is not easy to perform 533 
and is expensive, therefore, they would rely on proxy indicators as metrics for PES 534 
effectiveness. 535 
As one of the payers from a water supply company reported on an interview: “Impact 536 
indicators are more important, i.e. those who reflect the benefit of the activities performed, 537 
however it is not always possible to get them due to information availability issues or the 538 
cost of getting information. Therefore, we should seek a balance in those terms (Bogotá, 539 
June 2016). ” These results apparently contradict a comment made by one PES manager that 540 
said, “business men who are investing in those payments schemes expect that scientists 541 
 
 
could come with an equation that would tell them for every dollar spent how much water 542 




Intermediaries are concerned about getting impact evidence of their schemes on ES 547 
for several reasons, most of them linked to their wish to keep their modus operandi. 548 
Evidence of ES improvement or maintenance would support keeping payers on board, 549 
attract more payers in the long term, sustain conservation jobs, and maintain trust 550 
relationships with both payers and providers. These concerns are seen on interviews, 551 
questionnaires and are similar to those found in the practitioners’ literature (e.g. Bremer et 552 
al., 2016; Higgins and Zimmerling, 2013). Intermediaries are also clearly concerned about 553 
their reputation as PES managers and are aware that providing evidence of PES impacts on 554 
ES is a central issue on this matter. This result is consistent with the one obtained by Fisher 555 
and Brown (2014) regarding the use of the ES concept and its derived tools by conservation 556 
practitioners. The cases analyzed provide some evidence that personal values also play a 557 
role on the intermediaries’ concerns with the evidence of PES impacts. Most of the 558 
interviewed representatives feel personally engaged with the local communities in which 559 
they work and with the environmental issues, and want the schemes to be effective. 560 
Payers do expect evidence of environmental benefits achieved by the scheme in 561 
terms of ES and expect intermediaries to perform monitoring and report its results. Answers 562 
from both payers and intermediaries’ perceptions about payers’ demands pointed to this 563 
direction. However, when it comes to express the most important indicators for them, 564 
payers would mostly point to proxy indicators, for example, total area protected or number 565 
 
 
of planted trees, instead of selecting more indicators linked to the target ES, for instance, 566 
the  decrease of nitrogen and phosphorus concentration on water. Potential reasons may 567 
include the importance of indicators mostly for the sake of corporate sustainability reports 568 
in which specific indicators are not needed, or due to an assumption that proxy indicators 569 
are directly related to the desired effect in the targeted ES. 570 
Providers are also interested in the PES impacts. Questions regarding motivation to 571 
engage in the scheme were able to capture their interest in the ES itself, instead of solely the 572 
payment, either in cash or in kind, for performing conservation practices in their properties. 573 
Most of them pointed water resources conservation as one of the most important 574 
motivations and declared that they would engage in the scheme even without economic 575 
incentives. This does not necessarily mean that providers are not interested in economic 576 
benefits, as at least half of the interviewees reported being motivated by increases in 577 
productivity; however,  these results contradict the simplistic idea of a “service provider” as 578 
proposed in the literature (Wunder, 2005) and give clear indication that the so-called 579 
providers understand themselves as ES beneficiaries too and are willing to cooperate for 580 
conservation in case they receive technical and material support for that. Other recent 581 
studies in Latin-American cases have pointed to similar results. Bremer et al. (2014) showed 582 
that in Ecuador, landowners were motivated to participate in the program for a variety of 583 
reasons, including a “high value placed on the water provisioning services of the páramo 584 
[ecosystem] (Bremer et al. 2014, p. 122).” Intrinsic motivations have been also found in 585 
parallel with utilitarian arguments among landowners in other Latin-American cases. For 586 
instance, (Kosoy et al., 2008) found that indigenous groups participating in conservation 587 
schemes in Mexico had religious reasons in addition to the concerns with the forest 588 
provision of benefits. They considered forests as "sacred" places, with caves and other sites 589 
 
 
being used as temples (Kosoy et al., 2008, p. 2080). In another study, a desire to “care for 590 
the land” was found as one of the main motives for participation in PES schemes in Mexico 591 
(Méndez-López et al., 2015, p. 695). 592 
In part, the results found in the present study could be a consequence of the 593 
discourses held in the field by intermediaries while negotiating with landowners. Most of the 594 
intermediaries in the studied cases do not frame the proposed conservation practices as 595 
something that would only benefit downstream users but most of them emphasize the 596 
benefits that conservation will also have for those who live upstream. They argue that 597 
protecting water bodies, like springs and creeks, is fundamentally important for the 598 
providers themselves. During interviews, it became clear that providers tend to assume that 599 
the conservation practices are good for their own sake. In fact, the same water resources are 600 
shared and used by all, although distributed unevenly throughout the watershed.  601 
6. Why	those	schemes	keep	working	if	there	is	no	evidence	of	improvement	of	602 
the	target	ES	yet?	603 
Most of respondents from the three groups in all four schemes perceive the lack of 604 
evidence as a matter of time, because the schemes under study are relatively new and that 605 
the monitoring process is still incipient. They understand that the watershed would require 606 
more time to respond to the conservation practices undertaken. Still, most of the 607 
respondents from both providers and payers groups showed that they believe the scheme 608 
will produce beneficial ES outcomes. This may be explained by the presence of the common 609 
belief that “more forest leads to more water quantity” and better water quality (Kosoy et al. 610 
2007, p. 451) in the discourses from both providers and payers, according to the interviews. 611 
An additional explanation for the perseverance of such schemes relies on the extra 612 
benefits it brings to actors. It appears that PES fit well into the agenda of several of them, 613 
 
 
mainly of the intermediaries and payers. Intermediaries benefit from this approach due to 614 
the central role they must play to sustain such a scheme as several tasks involved in the PES 615 
design and implementation are required, such as property rights verification, constant visits 616 
to the field, and one-by-one negotiation with local farmers (Vatn 2010). As noted by Pham et 617 
al. (2010), intermediaries also act as information providers, mediators, watchdogs, 618 
arbitrators and bridge builders, among a series of other functions. Vatn (2010, p. 1247) 619 
concludes that “this explains why in PES schemes the intermediary is the dominant agent — 620 
whether the state, firms or NGOs of various kinds. The intermediary defines the good, 621 
establishes the group of ‘sellers’ and ‘buyers’ and even often set a predefined price.” 622 
In parallel with that, the strong presence of the ES approach in the global 623 
conservation agenda since MEA (2005) means that more funding through international 624 
cooperation is available for this type of approach (Fisher and Brown, 2014). Among the 625 
studied cases, there was government funding from The Netherlands and US, and 626 
development banks. In addition, PES have been recently assuming an important position in 627 
the environmental institutional configuration of Colombia through several laws and decrees 628 
(Rojas-Sanchez, 2014). It has been promoted as a national conservation strategy that 629 
culminated with the announcement (7th July 2017) of the new “Payment for Environmental 630 
Services Policy” by the Colombian Ministry of Environment and the National Department of 631 
Planning PES schemes are expected to escalate (MINAMBIENTE, 2017). Thus, working with 632 
the ES approach could mean more funding available for the conservation business and, 633 
therefore, more jobs. 634 
From the payers’ side, although ES improvement was the first motivation to enter the 635 
scheme for more than half of respondents, additional motivations play a strong role. These 636 
include, for example, fulfilling corporate socio-environmental policy requirements, 637 
 
 
improving corporate image and local relations, and complying with legal environmental 638 
requirements. These additional payers’ motivations could explain a potential permanence of 639 
payers in the schemes even without evidence of PES impacts on the target ES. 640 
Although the literature on why firms engage in PES schemes as payers is almost non-641 
existent, there are several papers discussing the reasons behind the adoption of corporate 642 
socio-environmental policy (CSR), which respondents pointed as one of the main reasons for 643 
the adoption of PES. Hemingway and Maclagan (2004) discussed the hypothesis of 644 
managers’ personal values influencing the adoption of CSR practices by their companies. 645 
They proposed that cultural factors, such as religious beliefs and moral values of managers, 646 
could play an important role. Vives (2006) presented a survey covering more than a 647 
thousand small and medium firms in Latin America that had implemented responsible 648 
practices of a variety of types. The major motivations found by Vives were increment profits, 649 
but also religion/ethics, motivating workforce, and building relationships. In a survey with 650 
corporate leaders, Ditlev-Simonsen & Midttun (2011) found that branding and reputation 651 
were the primary CSR drivers among Norway companies. Babiak & Trendafilova (2011) 652 
studied the motives behind the adoption of environmental management practices as part of 653 
CSR among U.S. sports leagues. They found that strategic and legitimacy motives, connected 654 
to the need to address institutional pressures and social expectations, were among the main 655 
drivers of the CSR adoption. Executives also associated these choices with increasing chances 656 
for financial collaborations with sponsors that were interested in environmental issues. 657 
Thus, although economic motives exist, social norms are also important. Indeed, as pointed 658 
out by organizational sociology scholars, organizations are particularly attentive to what 659 
other organizations do when adopting certain practices (Hougland et al., 1980). Firms may 660 
experience pressure from organizations upon which they depend, emulate other 661 
 
 
organizations because of their success, or just follow the advice of professional associations 662 
from their sector (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Exploring the extent to which such 663 
“institutional isomorphism” applies to PES programs may have implications also for our 664 




The results indicate that providers from the studied cases are willing to take part on 669 
some costs to adopt conservation practices, for example, by setting aside part of their arable 670 
land for vegetation protection, if there is an incentive for that, i.e. if they are not the only 671 
ones to bear the costs. As one interviewee expressed, “I have always been concerned with 672 
conservation and I expect that with the economic incentives I can dedicate my land to 673 
protect water springs without affecting my income for that”. As most providers are engaging 674 
motivated mainly by water resources conservation, if the desired environmental impact is 675 
not met in the long term, there is a chance that they would drop out from the scheme not 676 
because of lack of economic incentives, but mostly because their expected benefits in terms 677 
of ES were not achieved. Under this assumption, evidence of PES environmental outcomes is 678 
therefore important not only to keep payers on board, but also providers. 679 
When intermediaries were asked if payers would only pay under the condition of PES 680 
impacts being demonstrated they showed no consensus. This result is consistent with the 681 
one obtained from the payers. When asked if they would stop paying in case the ES 682 
improvement is not achieved with the time, payers also showed no consensus, with answers 683 
relatively balanced along the scale. This lack of consensus could be due to the relative 684 
importance attributed by each payer to the additional motivations they have to participate. 685 
 
 
In addition, it may also reflect the ability of the payer to bear the risk: bigger payers would 686 
be less worried about the ES outcomes, while small payers would be more keen to check if 687 
the investments in conservation are giving returns. Although the small sample payers in this 688 
study do not allow for a clear conclusion regarding this latter possibility, it provides an 689 
interesting hypothesis for further research.  690 
The question of whether PES schemes will survive or not in the long term remains 691 
dependent on additional empirical research, however the present study demonstrates that 692 
several motivations are behind the engagement of providers, intermediaries and payers in 693 
PES schemes. Therefore, the perceived additional benefits the actors have while 694 
participating in such schemes may partly explain the future long-term maintenance of this 695 
conservation approach even under lack of evidence of their impacts.  696 
8. Limitations	of	this	study	697 
We believe the results presented here can shed some light on the issue of the long-698 
term durability of PES schemes; however, it is worth mentioning that the scope of this study 699 
is limited to the four cases presented and, therefore, more research would be needed to test 700 
similar hypotheses in the field. In addition, the low response rate obtained among payers is 701 
of some concern, as in the studied cases they are usually managers of large organizations 702 
and have a limited time for interviews or questionnaires. However, several firms that 703 
responded the questionnaire are among the largest ones in Colombia and their funding for 704 
conservation is expressive. A second concern refers to the accessibility to the field in this 705 
type of scheme. As intermediaries are the ones who know exactly who the schemes’ 706 
providers are and where they live, it is very hard to perform interviews and questionnaires 707 
without the presence of at least one manager or technician belonging to the intermediaries 708 
group. We believe that in occasions in which it is not possible to avoid their presence while 709 
 
 
interviewing, answers from providers may be partially biased as some of them would be 710 
concerned with not threatening the trust relationship developed with the intermediaries. 711 
Whenever it was possible, questionnaires were conducted without the practitioners 712 
presence, and double-check of answers was performed through interviews. An additional 713 
point is that interviews and questionnaires are only able to capture declared points of view, 714 
however, communicated content is frequently different from actual behavior. Finally, we are 715 
aware that the use of Likert Scale can introduce biases to the answers; in order to address 716 
this, we built questionnaires based on preliminary interviews and additional interviews were 717 
undertaken in order to confirm first answers or to receive explanations on the choices made. 718 
 719 
5. CONCLUSION	720 
There is not a straightforward answer for whether PES schemes will survive in the 721 
long term in the absence of evidence of their environmental benefits. What it is clear is that 722 
the lack of evidence has been already a matter of criticism from the scientific community 723 
and a matter of concern among PES intermediaries. In this paper, we explored four water-724 
related PES schemes in which became clear that the evidence of environmental outcomes is 725 
important not only for those who pay for the schemes but also for intermediaries and the 726 
so-called providers. However, as PES schemes have important indirect benefits, mainly for 727 
the intermediaries and payers, there is a chance that those schemes will survive the lack of 728 
effectiveness evidence in the long term if that depends solely on these groups’ wishes. Still, 729 
as providers understand themselves also as ES beneficiaries in these water-related schemes, 730 
and even if most of them understand that ES changes may take some time to be observed, 731 
 
 
the lack of evidence of PES environmental outcomes in the long run could discourage their 732 
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